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INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of 2020, a new coronavirus detected in Wu-
han, China gave rise to a massive global health concern.1 The 
first report of a cluster of patients with pneumonia from an un-
known cause was provided to the World Health Organization 
(WHO) China Country Office on December 31, 2019.2 Subse-
quently, multiple cases of this pneumonia grew rapidly through-
out Wuhan and were primarily linked with exposures in sea-
food wholesale markets.1,3 The causative agent was isolated on 
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January 7, and its whole genome sequence was analyzed.4 On 
February 11, 2020, the WHO named the novel coronavirus as 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) 
and its accompanying disease as coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19).5 Despite efforts to contain the virus, infectious 
outbreaks spread globally from China.5 WHO designated the 
outbreak, which had at the time reached multiple continents 
outside Asia, as a pandemic on March 11 in an effort to help 
coordinate international efforts to mitigate spread of the con-
tagion.6 
As of October 25, 2020, there have been more than 42 mil-
lion confirmed cases and more than 1.1 million deaths.7 Al-
though the novel coronavirus is being investigated worldwide, 
many questions lay unanswered. Here, we review the epide-
miology, risk factors, and transmission of SARS-CoV-2. We seek 
to outlines measures for individuals, organizations, and na-
tions to minimize the risk of household, nosocomial, and lo-
cal community transmission. We also investigated preventive 
methods through which to inhibit further transmission via com-
parison with the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavi-
rus (MERS-CoV) outbreak in 2012 and the severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) outbreak in 2002.8
EPIDEMIOLOGY
Reproduction number (R0) 
Calculating the mean doubling time of a disease using repro-
duction numbers (R0) allows researchers to understand the 
speed and extent of a disease’s transmission. Current R0 esti-
mates for COVID-19 are not at consensus: the exact numbers 
of infected people cannot be appropriately surveyed due to 
asymptomatic spread, increased likelihood of detection of se-
vere cases, and low availability of PCR test kits.9 One research 
team at Boston Children’s Hospital estimated R0 to be between 
2.0 and 3.3 by applying an Incidence Decay and Exponential 
Adjustment (IDEA) model.10 By fitting a deterministic Sus-
ceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) epidemiologi-
cal model, a team at Lancaster University suggested R0 to be 
approximately 3.1.11 They assumed Poisson-distributed daily 
increments using daily reported data in Chinese cities and in 
other countries. Another group of researchers at York Univer-
sity also used a deterministic SEIR compartmental model, but 
proposed an R0 value of 6.47.12 A simplified version of the Bats-
Hosts-Reservoir-People transmission network model, the Res-
ervoir-People transmission network model, was created by a 
team at Xiamen University and calculated R0 values for each 
stage of transmission.13 Under this model, R0 values for reser-
voir-to-person and person-to-person were assessed as 2.3 and 
3.58, respectively. Epidemiologists in London estimated that 
1.5–3.5 people were infected by each case in the early stage of 
the outbreak.14 Overall, low numbers of reported cases and a 
lack of detection methods at the early stage of this crisis gave 
high uncertainty to modeling.9 Further studies with larger sam-
ple sizes are needed to approximate the true value.
Incubation period
The incubation period of COVID-19 is widely believed to be 1 
to 2 weeks.15 A study published on March 26 reported a 5.2-day 
[95% confidence interval (CI), 4.1–7.0] incubation period.16 
Another study reached a similar estimate of 5.1 days (95% CI, 
4.5–5.8) and reported that 97.5% of symptomatic cases devel-
oped symptoms within 11.5 days (95% CI, 8.2–15.6).17 The 
WHO reported that patients who contract COVID-19 mostly 
develop signs and symptoms after 5–6 days from infection.18 
Accordingly, the WHO recommends travelers returning from 
affected areas to self-monitor for symptoms for 14 days and to 
follow the national protocols of receiving countries.19 Howev-
er, some outliers exist. One Japanese woman tested positive 
on February 6 after previously testing negative, and case num-
ber 25 in Korea was confirmed positive again on February 
28, six days after discharge.20 However, it is currently unclear 
whether these cases suggest a dormancy period longer than 14 
days, the possibility of reinfection, or sustained viral load fol-
lowing functional recovery. Further research on the incubation 
period or recurrence of the virus is needed to eliminate hid-
den transmission.
Non-specific clinical features
Since early clinical features are not disease-specific, early di-
agnosis of the disease requires clinical awareness about the 
SARS-CoV-2 infection.21 According to two studies aggregating 
100596 cases, 80–81% of symptomatic patients show mild symp-
toms, and 13.8% show severe disease.18,22 Reported symptoms 
include dry cough, fever, malaise, nasal congestion, fatigue, 
shortness of breath, sputum production, headache, sore throat, 
myalgia or arthralgia, diarrhea, dyspnea, hemoptysis, anos-
mia, ageusia, headache, and nausea or vomiting.23-25 Anosmia 
and ageusia specifically occur in 47–88% of mild to moderate 
COVID-19 cases and often co-occur.26,27 Females are more like-
ly to have anosmia and ageusia with COVID-19. The limited 
data available suggest that such dysfunction is self-resolving 
within 14 days after disease recovery, with over half recovering 
from anosmia in the first 8 days.27 In early cases reported in Wu-
han, severe acute respiratory infection symptoms were shown, 
and some patients rapidly developed acute respiratory distress 
syndrome (ARDS) and other serious complications.25
Comparison to SARS and MERS 
SARS and COVID-19 share similar transmission routes, risk fac-
tors, and disease progression. The SARS epidemic reported 8098 
cases with 774 deaths and was controlled within 8 months.28 
Twenty-six countries experienced infections, but most cases 
were concentrated in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Canada. SARS is only transmissible by symptomatic pa-
tients, with viral load peaking 6–11 days after onset of illness.29 
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However, COVID-19 differs from SARS in three aspects: asymp-
tomatic transmission, a well-connected initial outbreak site, 
and strain on public health resources. With SARS, the co-oc-
currence of symptoms with viral shedding allowed for a sensi-
tive case definition and isolation of high-risk patients.28 House-
hold secondary attack rates for SARS were 6.2% in Singapore 
and 10% in Toronto, compared to a secondary attack rate of 
30% for COVID-19 by some higher estimates.30-32 SARS also has 
both a longer time to peak viral load from onset and a shorter 
incubation period than COVID-19, explaining the decreased 
likelihood of asymptomatic transmission in SARS.33,34 The R0 
of SARS general transmission ranges from 0.58–1.17, partially 
due to isolation control measures.35 Three out of five super 
spreading events in Singapore were possible largely because 
of atypical case presentations. Two additional super spreading 
events were propagated by inadequate plumbing or ventilation, 
instead of the failure to detect infected cases.35-38 In contrast, as-
ymptomatic transmission of COVID-19 leads to increased com-
munity and household transmission. In February, Liu, et al.39 
documented eight COVID-19 super spreading events in China 
through restaurants. Difficulty tracing asymptomatic carriers, 
combined with high international traffic through Wuhan, al-
lowed community transmission and made tracing patients 
more difficult. The resulting demand on hospital resources im-
paired quarantining efforts on hospital staff, and the existence 
of asymptomatic carriers lessened the effectiveness of patient 
isolation.
The 2012 MERS epidemic infected 2553 people as of March 
2020 with 876 associated deaths.40 MERS also shares a similar 
disease course, transmission routes, and risk factors with SARS 
and COVID-19.40 Like COVID-19, MERS can be transmitted by 
asymptomatic carriers.41 However, the virus requires prolonged 
exposure before transmission and is primarily spread sporadi-
cally by animal-to-human transmission, decreasing the likeli-
hood of a large-scale outbreak.42 For example, the peak viral 
load occurs 7 days after onset in cases without needing supple-
mental oxygen and 14–21 days in cases delivered oxygen, in 
contrast to the 3-day peak viral load in COVID-19.34 However, 
the incubation of MERS, 4.5–7.8 days, is more similar to SARS 
than COVID-19. The estimated secondary attack rate for MERS 
ranges from 0.42–15.8%.43 In one study by Drosten, et al.,44 only 
14 out of 280 secondary household contacts among 26 index 
patients tested positive by antibody tests or reverse transcrip-
tion polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). Nosocomial trans-
mission accounts for a significant portion of human-to-human 
transmission: 18.6% of MERS cases involved healthcare work-
ers (HCW).45 While the R0 for general transmission of MERS 
ranges from <1 to 3,11 but the R0 specific for nosocomial trans-
mission is estimated to be between 1.9 and 4.04.46 Table 1 sum-
marizes the comparisons of SARS, MERS, and COVID-19. 
PERSON-TO-PERSON TRANSMISSION 
Nosocomial transmission of SARS, MERS, and 
COVID-19
The previous 2003 SARS outbreak led to over 966 infections 
among health care staff.47 A low minimum distance between 
beds, previously performing resuscitation in the ward, low 
availability of washing facilities for staff, staff working while 
sick, and using ventilation or oxygen therapy have been shown 
to be associated with SARS nosocomial transmission.48 Effec-
tive strategies against nosocomial transmission were to isolate 
known carriers, ban hospital visitors, and close infected wards.49 
Patients with fever or respiratory distress in sites of the out-
break were isolated until SARS was ruled out.28 If the index pa-
tient could be identified before the estimated second incuba-
tion period, HCWs in contact with the patient were quarantined. 
If the index patient could not be identified, entire hospitals were 
closed.49 Some intensive care units (ICUs) were entirely con-
verted to negative pressure airflow, with hot, warm, and cold 
zones that necessitated full airborne precautions, droplet pre-
cautions, and no personal protective equipment (PPE), respec-
tively.50 In Toronto, the transmission was primarily nosocomi-
al.51 Enactment of hospital control, including droplet PPE and 
negative airflow isolation, 20 days after the first SARS death re-
duced the number of cases to 0 for 20 consecutive days. How-
ever, subsequent relaxation of hospital control led to a resur-
gence of infections.51
With MERS, a sensitive case definition was critical to identi-
fy sources of and to eliminate transmission.46 In Thailand, nos-
ocomial transmission was avoided entirely from three index 
Table 1. Characteristics of SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 Transmission
SARS MERS COVID-19
Asymptomatic transmission N33,34 Y41 Y22,23
Peak viral load after onset 6–11 days29
7 days (mild) 
14–21 days34
3 days34
Secondary attack rate 6.2–10%30-32 0.42–15.8%43 Up to 30%30-32
Primary mode of transmission Human-to-human Animal-to-human42 Human-to-human
R0 (general transmission) 0.58–1.1735 <1–311,46 1.5–6.4712,14
Incubation period 3.6–4.4 days33,34 4.5–7.8 days43 5.1–11.5 days17
COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome; R0, reproduction number.
Prominent characteristics of SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 are aggregated. Numerical values for secondary attack rate, R0, etc. were retrieved as ranges of the 
lowest and highest estimations described in each respective reference.
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cases by directing all patients with acute respiratory illness 
traveling from countries with MERS outbreaks to designated 
entrances and airborne isolation rooms until MERS could be 
ruled out.52 HCWs were required to adopt droplet precautions 
when working with suspected patients, as per the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. In the United States, 
HCWs exposed to suspected cases were required to undergo 
home quarantine for 14 days and to test negative before return-
ing to work.53 Compared to COVID-19, MERS is a more fatal 
condition that may also spread before confirmatory diagno-
sis,41 and its nosocomial transmission was controlled by similar 
early identification, isolation, and PPE guidelines as with SARS.
By February 11, 2020, 1716 health staff members in China 
were confirmed SARS-CoV-2 positive.54 In a cohort of 138 pa-
tients, Wang, et al.55 estimated that 41% were infected by noso-
comial transmission. WHO recommends droplet and contact 
precautions for patients suspected of COVID-19 and airborne 
precautions while performing aerosol-generating procedures 
(intubation, cardiac resuscitation, high-flow nasal cannula, 
bronchoscopy), though some recommend airborne precau-
tions in all cases.56 Insights from the SARS outbreak have been 
used to create a number of recommendations for controlling 
COVID-19, which are summarized in Table 2. In short, it is rec-
ommended to place symptomatic hospital staff under self-
quarantine, equip patients with N95 masks, and inform receiv-
ing hospitals of suspected infectious arrivals beforehand.54,57 
Patients with cough, dyspnea, and fever should be isolated in 
daily-disinfected, single negative pressure rooms until testing 
negative for COVID-19. Airborne precautions, including N95 
respirator masks, gown, double-layered gloves, coverall, and 
protective shoes, have also been recommended.57 Patients 
with mild symptoms may be sent for home care, but with the 
stipulations that home isolation necessitates careful prior as-
sessment and that patients who do not recover should imme-
diately seek further treatment.57
An elevated risk of hospital transmission has been described 
subsequent to treating critically-ill patients.50,58,59 For the criti-
cally ill, it is recommended to adopt airborne precautions. Ad-
ditional critical care measures include equipping patients with 
masks during high flow nasal cannula treatments, using ven-
tilators with filters and heat-moisture exchangers, and using 
masks during bronchoscopy.59 When possible, rapid intuba-
tion techniques should be utilized, bag-mask ventilation should 
be avoided, and early planned intubations should be priori-
tized rather than emergency intubations.50,60 For prolonged 
procedures, powered air-purifying respirators may be an al-
ternative to N95 masks, but no trials have demonstrated im-
proved or equivalent risk reduction, compared to the N95.50 
One group described an increased risk of transmission with 
pulmonary function tests and recommended, in addition to 
isolation and disinfection procedures, suspending tests for sus-
pected COVID-19 cases and for patients without an immedi-
ate need.61 Oxygen therapy can disperse particles in varying 
patterns depending on the devices used. Continuous positive 
airway pressure (CPAP) via an oronasal mask and non-inva-
sive ventilation (NIV) via an air-cushioned helmet showed min-
imum room contamination among nasal cannula, oronasal 
mask, Venturi mask, non-rebreathing mask, CPAP via an oro-
nasal mask, CPAP via nasal pillows, high flow nasal cannula, 
NIV via a full face mask, NIV via a helmet without tight air cush-
ion, and NIV via a helmet with tight air cushion.60
Transmission by asymptomatic individuals
Asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic transmission of COV-
ID-19 have been documented. Studies in January 2020 were 
among the first to show the possibility of asymptomatic trans-
mission by demonstrating mild or asymptomatic cases in an 
estimated 80% of patients, as well as an asymptomatic infec-
tion of a child.22,23 On March 6, Luo, et al.62 traced three SARS-
CoV-2 infections from patients who otherwise had no contact 
with Wuhan or animals to asymptomatic carrier sources. As-
ymptomatic transmission was also demonstrated by a Wuhan 
resident to five family members and by clusters of patients in 
Singapore.63,64 Asymptomatic infection is consistent with the 
longer incubation period, shorter time to peak viral load, and 
shorter serial interval of COVID-19. Nishiura and colleagues 
estimated the serial interval by following 28 infector-infected 
pairs as 4.6 days (95% CI, 3.5–5.9), shorter than many incuba-
Table 2. Effective Measures against Nosocomial Transmission of CO-
VID-19 and SARS
COVID-19
•  Rapid isolation of HCWs, patients, and wards suspected of contacting 
infection56
• Daily chlorine-containing disinfection89
•  PPE consisting of N95 respirator, gown, double-layered gloves, coverall, 
shoe covers46
• Separation of patient and HCW entrances and exits58
• Limiting patients per room58
• Equipping patients with masks46
• Adopting oxygen administration techniques that minimize droplet spread56
• Adopting airborne precautions for aerosol-generating procedures46,52
SARS
•  Rapid isolation of HCWs, patients, and wards suspected of contacting 
infection26
• Construction of SARS-specific hospitals45
• Banning hospital visitors45
• Spacing patient beds44
•  Conversion of ICUs to negative-pressure environments, with hot zones, 
warm zones, and cold zones46
COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; HCW, healthcare worker; SARS, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome; PPE: personal protective equipment, ICU intensive 
care unit.
Measures against nosocomial transmission described to be effective are ag-
gregated for SARS and COVID-19. Measures against MERS nosocomial trans-
mission were similar to SARS in the articles evaluated and were not included 
to avoid redundancy.
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tion period estimates, suggesting transmission during subclin-
ical infection.65 
Pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic infections are expect-
ed to contribute significantly to COVID-19 transmission. On 
March 13, Nishiura and colleagues used data from 565 Japa-
nese citizens to estimate the proportion of asymptomatic in-
fections as 30.8%.66 With greater access to antibody testing, a 
Stanford group in Santa Clara County recruited 3330 people 
used lateral flow immunoassays to estimate the population-
weighted seroprevalence of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 as 2.49% 
(95% CI, 1.80–3.17%) to 4.16% (95% CI, 2.58–5.70%).67 Another 
group in a northern Iran province used a cohort of 528 people 
to estimate the population antibody seropositivity prevalence 
as 33% (95% CI, 28–39%). Of the sample, 65 subjects (18%) had 
no symptoms, but had antibodies to SARS-CoV-2.68 Contact 
tracing of 100 patients revealed similar secondary attack rates 
between pre-symptomatic and symptomatic exposures.69 By-
ambasuren, et al.70 recently found in a meta-analysis of 663 posi-
tive cases that 17% were asymptomatic, with a 42% lower rela-
tive risk of asymptomatic transmission. It is estimated that up 
to 62% of transmissions occurs pre-symptomatically, with true 
asymptomatic transmission being uncommon.71
Severity of illness and transmission
Preliminary evidence from epidemiological and biological stud-
ies have suggested both increased and prolonged viral trans-
mission associated with severe illness in COVID-19. Reports 
have identified an increased risk of contracting the disease for 
HCWs who care for or resuscitate critically ill people with CO-
VID-19.50,59 The median duration of viral shedding for severely 
ill patients was calculated as 31 days from illness onset by one 
study, higher than the estimations of median viral shedding 
duration (17 days) for the collective population.72,73 In a cohort 
of 113 patients, severe illness, emergent treatments (cortico-
steroid therapy and mechanical ventilation), and delayed re-
covery were associated with longer viral shedding times.72 A 
separate cohort of 32 ICU and non-ICU patients with COVID-19 
demonstrated a viral shedding time about 7 days longer in the 
ICU group.74 However, He, et al.75 found no differences in either 
viral load or shedding time between 94 mild and severe pa-
tients. Given ambiguous findings relating severity to increased 
transmission, it is currently unclear whether the apparent in-
creased infection rates from patients who are critically ill intrin-
sically result from elevated viral load or are generated from aero-
sol-generating emergent techniques. 
RISK FACTORS
Demographics and comorbid conditions
The most well-documented demographic risk factor for infec-
tion and morbidity is old age. Jing, et al.76 reported that older 
individuals (aged ≥60 years) are the most susceptible to house-
hold transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Out of 799 patients, Chen, et 
al.77 described that patients who died were older on average 
than those who survived. Male sex, obesity, and smoking have 
also been shown to be associated with mortality, though it is 
difficult to quantify the relative risks thereof due to possible 
confounding and limited sample size.78
Novel comorbidities associated with poor COVID-19 out-
comes are continuously being described. Among those dis-
covered early, hypertension occurs most frequently with infec-
tion and has been validated across multiple studies as a risk 
factor for mortality.79,80 Respiratory disease, cardiovascular dis-
ease, diabetes, kidney disease, and cancer have also been linked 
to increased risks of death.79,80 In some studies, coagulopathies 
and inflammation appear to be linked to severe outcomes or 
death. In a cohort study of 201 patients, neutrophilia, higher lac-
tate dehydrogenase, and D-dimer were associated with the 
development of ARDS and death.81 The inflammatory biomark-
ers procalcitonin, interleukin-6, tumor necrosis factor alpha, 
and neutrophil to lymphocyte ratio are also thought to be risk 
factors for fatal outcomes.82 In a meta-analysis of nine studies, 
Lippi, et al.83 linked thrombocytopenia with COVID-19 severi-
ty and mortality. Kidney disease and markers of abnormal kid-
ney function have also been shown to be associated with death 
in COVID-19.84 Although further work is necessary to confirm 
current prognostic markers for vulnerability to COVID-19, it 
seems likely that poor cardiovascular and respiratory function 
predispose people to adverse outcomes. 
Environmental factors
SARS-CoV-2 environmental risk factors comprise surface con-
tamination, fecal-oral transmission, and airborne transmis-
sion.85,86 In an experimental study aerosolizing SARS-CoV-2-
WA1-2020 viral particles, SARS-CoV-2 remained viable on 
plastic and stainless steel for up to 72 hours.87 In some hospi-
tal wards in China, the virus was detected on floors, computer 
mice, trash cans, and on handrails.88 SARS-CoV-2 has been de-
tected in feces during and after symptomatic infection.86 Rou-
tine disinfection has been shown to reduce contamination: 
none of the surfaces or sewage disinfection pools in wards 
with SARS-CoV-2 patients were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA 
when daily chlorine-containing disinfection was followed.89
WHO guidelines encouraging social distancing of at least 2 
meters are based on early evidence suggesting that COVID-19 
is primarily spread by large droplets (above 5 µm), which gen-
erally fall to surfaces before traveling 2 meters.85,88 However, 
there is some evidence that SARS-CoV-2 distributes widely by 
aerosol and beyond 2 meters by droplets. SARS-CoV-2 has been 
detected in the air 3 hours following manual aerosolization and 
in the air up to 4 meters from COVID-19 patient rooms.87,88 Aero-
solized viral RNA has been detected in protective apparel re-
moval rooms, suggesting resuspension of viral particles, and 
in crowded public spaces.90 In a systematic review of 10 studies 
by Bahl, et al.56 eight studies suggested that droplets travel 
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above a 2-meter distance when coughing or sneezing. Howev-
er, Liu, et al.90 found negligible viral air contamination in hos-
pitals with negative ventilation and chlorine-containing disin-
fection, suggesting the effectiveness of proper sanitation.
CONTROLLING MEASURES
Diagnostic testing 
It is known from previous MERS and SARS outbreaks that ear-
ly detection of infection is critical for blocking further trans-
mission.52,91 Genome sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 enabled the 
rapid development of screening methods. Clinical testing for 
COVID-19 comprises either RT-PCR, which is more widely 
used, or antibody-based tests. Currently, the majority of cases 
worldwide are confirmed through nucleic acid laboratory tests.
Early eligibility criteria typically required an epidemiologi-
cal link, the onset of symptoms, and negative ruling for other 
respiratory diseases in many countries. HCWs or those vulner-
able to severe infection were eligible for testing after initial signs 
of fever or respiratory illness. By February 20, only China, Tai-
wan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Oman, Turkey, Colombia, Ga-
bon, and Rwanda offered testing to anyone with symptoms, 
and only South Korea provided asymptomatic testing,92 A large 
majority had no testing policy. By March 2, the majority of na-
tions around the world had developed testing policies, though 
many nations necessitated patients to demonstrate an epide-
miological or vulnerability status. Some regions, including Sin-
gapore, northern Italy, and South Korea, effectively employed 
liberal testing eligibility criteria, in which any citizen with a phy-
Fig. 1. (A) Number of countries with stay at home measures over time, stratified by level of enforcement. Restrictions with exceptions allow excursions for 
grocery shopping, exercise, and “essential trips.” Restrictions with minimal exceptions allow only one member per household to leave and only for cer-
tain periods. (B) Number of countries with restrictions on gatherings over time, stratified by gathering size. Data were obtained from the Oxford COVID-19 
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sician’s recommendation (Singapore) or with personal concern 
(South Korea, Northern Italy) could receive testing. On April 
29, 20 nations offered testing to all people; 43 offered testing to 
all those who showed symptoms; and 48 offered testing only 
to vulnerable populations or those with epidemiological links 
after showing symptoms.92
Testing capacity has increased over time, with more accu-
rate laboratory equipment and test kit supply production. By 
April 21, hotspots like Italy, New Zealand, Denmark, Canada, 
the US, and South Korea cumulatively conducted 23.98, 19.66, 
17.36, 14.99, 12.65, 12.08, and 11.14 tests per 1000 people re-
spectively. Thirty-five nations offered 0–5 tests per 1000 peo-
ple; 13 nations offered 5–10 tests per 1000 people;93 and 27 
nations offered above 10 tests per 1000 people. The mean num-
ber of tests per 1000 conducted by all nations was 11.45. If the 
virus continues to spread on a global level, it will be increas-
ingly important to scale the production of accurate tests to 
match diagnostic demand.
Lockdown and movement restriction
The number of countries enforcing stay-at-home measures or 
gathering restrictions are summarized in Fig. 1, and effective 
lockdown measures are shown in Table 3. From February 10 
to March 1, fewer than 15 countries combined imposed either 
stay-at-home measures or gathering restrictions.94 By March 
10, 21 countries restricted gatherings, and 18 countries en-
forced stay-at-home measures. Thirty-five recommended or 
required the closing of public schools. By April 1, 131 countries 
restricted gatherings, of which 79 countries restricted gather-
ings below 10 people. On the same date, 196 countries enforced 
stay-at-home measures, with 70 enforcing home quarantine 
except for grocery shopping, exercise, and “daily trips.” By April 
30, 83 countries restricted all gatherings, and 79 countries al-
lowed home excursions only for essential trips (Fig. 1). Sixteen 
countries limited home excursions, including essential trips, 
to once every few days for each household (minimal excep-
tions). Large-scale screening and training programs in COV-
ID-19 recognition and isolation were also established by both 
hospitals and WHO.95,96
Precautions against SARS nosocomial transmission encom-
passed lockdown measures similar to those of the COVID-19 
pandemic. In Beijing, local police, community health workers, 
and volunteers coordinated quarantining efforts.91 Beijing 
closed all public entertainment sites on April 24, 2003, within 
2 months of the initial importation of the virus. All schools, ex-
cept universities, were closed. Restaurants and businesses were 
not closed, but screened for fever at entry. Travel advisories and 
screenings were implemented in multiple locations instead of 
travel bans.28,97 Singapore utilized widespread temperature 
testing and encouraged its citizens to check for fever several 
times per day.28
By April 30, 122 countries had closed educational institutions, 
including universities. The efficacy of school closures in reduc-
ing transmission is based on previous influenza outbreaks and 
is expected to be highest if the reproductive number is <2, if clo-
sures are implemented early, and if attack rates are higher in 
children.98 The attack rate in children for influenza is 15.2% (95% 
CI, 11.4–18.9%). However, the attack rate of COVID-19 in chil-
dren has been estimated at only 7.2% (95% CI, 3.0–14.3%) and 
3.8% (95% CI, 0.8–10.6%) in males and females, respective-
ly.99,100 A systematic review by Viner and colleagues found little 
evidence that school closures during the SARS and COVID-19 
epidemics contributed significantly to curbing transmission, 
as transmission rates in schools were already low.98 One mod-
Table 3. Effective Lockdown and Quarantine Measures for COVID-19 and SARS
COVID-19
Screening Gathering restriction Mobility restriction
• Monitoring confirmed cases19
• Using widely available testing92
•  Development of clinical referral systems  
for suspected cases96
•  Global education resources for screening and 
control96
• Restricting gathering sizes94
• Closing public schools96
•  Limiting the maximum number of people per 
room95
•  Administering early travel bans from infection 
hotspots95
• Limiting trips outside the household94
• Screening for infection at airport entry
SARS
Screening Gathering restriction Mobility restriction
•  Using thermometers for temperature  
screening97
• Monitoring confirmed cases28
•  Using community volunteers to coordinate 
quarantine91
•  Development of clinical referral systems  
for suspected cases
• Closing public schools97
• Restricting gathering sizes97
•  Administering travel advisories on infection 
hotspots28
• Screening for infection at airport entry97
COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome.
Measures for lockdown and quarantine described as effective against COVID-19 and SARS are aggregated. Community lockdown measures against MERS were 
unable to be found and thus not included.
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eling study using the UK population estimated that school clo-
sures in the COVID-19 epidemic have only reduced transmis-
sion by 2–4%.
CONCLUSION
As of May 26, 2020, more than 5 million cases and 300000 
deaths associated with COVID-19 have been recorded world-
wide. Likely to have resulted from bat-to-human transmission, 
SARS-CoV-2 exhibits high human-to-human transmission 
across households, hospitals, and communities. A major pro-
portion of cases are asymptomatic, and it is likely that asymp-
tomatic transmission contributes significantly to transmission. 
Efforts curbing transmission primarily comprise 1) early iden-
tification, either through targeted or indiscriminate testing 
and 2) lockdown and patient isolation. Previous lessons from 
SARS and MERS to reduce nosocomial and community trans-
mission, such as isolating patients with respiratory illness, plac-
ing infected HCWs under quarantine, creating designated spa-
tial pathways for suspected patients, and enabling the rapid 
development of testing, have been and should continue to be 
implemented. Novel studies describing methods to minimize 
aerosol generation during common hospital procedures can 
also be employed to curb transmission. Disinfection, precau-
tionary social distancing beyond the recommended 2 meters, 
and hand hygiene are valuable measures through which to pre-
vent environmental spread of the virus. 
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